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Contracting  with  private  landholders  for  labor  towards  production  of  environmental  services 
(payment for actions) or the environmental services themselves (payment for outcomes) is reliant 
on  the  environmental  organization’s  ability  to  monitor  and  assess  the  environmental  outcomes 
provided. Inaccurate and costly assessment reduces the cost effectiveness of the contract. Different 
assessment  technologies  will  have  different  impacts  on  the  cost  effectiveness  and  optimal 
contracting choice of the environmental organization. The paper compares the influence of field 
assessment  by  a  local  expert,  and  remote  assessment  via  satellite  imagery,  on  the  optimal 
contracting decision for the Western Australian wheat belt. 
INTRODUCTION 
In  Australia,  government  and  non-government  environmental  organizations  have  begun 
incorporating private lands into conservation programs primarily due to the high cost of establishing 
national  parks  and  reserves  (Figgis  2004).    Private  ownership  and  leasehold  controls  77%  of 
Australia’s land (DEHA and DAFF 2008). The land available to enter national parks and reserves will 
be insufficient for reserves alone to achieve the environmental organization’s goals and objectives of 
biodiversity  and  environmental  service  provision  into  the  future.    The  goals  and  objectives  of 
government and non-government environmental organizations are diverse, but consistently include 
broad  environmental  aims  which  require  long-term  investment.  For  example,  the  Australian 
Government  Department  of  the  Environment  and  Water  Resources  develops  and  implements 
national policy, programmes and legislation to ensure the protection, conservation and sustainable 
use of Australia’s natural environment, water resources and cultural heritage (DEWR 2007). The 
World Wide Fund for Nature state their mission is to stop the degradation of the planet’s natural 
environment and to build a future in which humans live in harmony with nature by: conserving the 
world’s biological diversity; ensuring that the use of renewable natural resources is sustainable; and 
promoting the reduction of pollution and wasteful consumption (WWF 2007). The broad, long-term 
nature of the goals and objectives of environmental organizations require them to make long-term 
investments in diverse conservation work. 
Government  and  non-government  environmental  organizations  have  introduced  a  number  of 
conservation schemes and programs designed to provide biodiversity and environmental services on 
private land through market-based instruments (Figgis 2004). Development of new conservation 
programs in Australia has progresses rapidly, with 19 pilot programs within the National Action Plan 
for  Salinity  and  Water  Quality  alone  (NAPSWQ  2008).  In  2009,  a  dedicated  Environmental 3 
 
Stewardship  program  was  launched  as  part  of  the  national  Caring  for  Our  Country  scheme.  In 
Western  Australia,  private  landholders  can  receive  a  wide  range  of  support  for  providing 
environmental services, including financial or labor assistance for conservation works, assistance 
entering into a covenant, as well as technical advice and training (Government of Western Australia 
2004). Internationally, conservation programs have existed for much longer than Australian. Most 
well  known  are  the  USA  Conservation  Reserve  Program  and  the  Wetlands  Reserve  Program 
(Hanrahan  and  Zinn  2005),  and  the  UK  Countryside  Stewardship  Scheme  and  Environmental 
Stewardship  (NE  2006).  Typically  conservation  schemes  have  contract  landholders  to  undertake 
actions which increase the probability of establishing or conserving a target vegetation community. 
Programs are now focusing on the contracts for the environmental outcomes of actions, rather than 
the actions themselves. 
The assessment of environmental contract compliance by landholders with conservation contracts 
by organizations have received limited attention in the literature. Internationally, reviews of agri-
environmental  policy  monitoring  in  the  UK  and  elsewhere  conclude  that  monitoring  to  assess 
ecosystem  change  incurs  significant  costs  and  is  prone  to  inaccuracy  in  the  form  of  mis-
classifications of vegetation types (Hooper 1992; National Audit Office 1997; World Bank 1998). A 
wide  variety  of  monitoring  techniques  are  available  to  the  organization,  each  with  a  unique 
combination of accuracy, cost and ease of use. The most popular method is on-ground field surveys 
by trained experts, but remote satellite imagery also has potential. The USA Conservation Security 
Program  takes  the  unusual  approach  of  providing  funds  directly  to  farmers  for  undertaking 
recordkeeping, monitoring, and evaluation themselves (Farm Policy Team 2006). 
Markov-chain decision process analysis is a usefully technique for the environmental organization to 
value collecting information about the landholder or their land to overcome the issue of adverse 
selection,  as  well  as  to  value  accurate  assessment  and  enforcement  at  the  completion  of  the 
contract to avoid moral hazard. Markov-chain decision processes determine the optimal decision 
when the outcome is based on a stochastic process. The stochastic process is represented as a 
matrix of the probability of transition from the present to the next or final state, with each decision 
option or action is represented by a unique matrix. The product of the various combinations of 
alternative decisions over time is then calculated and the optimal sequence of decisions determined 
(Bellman  1957).  The  impact  of  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  is  incorporated  into  the 
probability matrix and decision options. Markov-chain decision processes are particularly popular in 
medical science (Briggs and Sculpher 1998) and forest management (Taylor et al. 2009). 
The basic model of decision making based on Markov-chains has been developed into one where the 
decision makers do not know the current state but can engage in potentially costly and imperfect 
monitoring, known as partially observable Markov-chain decision processes (POMDP) (Smallwood 
and  Sondik  1973;  Puterman  1994;  Cassandra  1998;  Kaelbling  et  al.  1998).  Summaries  of  early 
POMDP analysis (Monahan 1982) , as well as more recent summaries (Cassandra 1998) highlight its 
growing popularity. POMDP is now being promoted to in behavioral sciences, expanding from its 
traditional  artificial  intelligence  base  (Littman  2009).  Currently  POMDP  is  receiving  attention  in 
analyzing environmental issues as it models the environmental as a set of states and transitions, as 
well as incorporating the use of costly and imperfect monitoring.  4 
 
Markov-chains have been used to estimate and model ecosystems as they represent a stochastic 
process that is defined on a discrete state space (Barber 1978; Usher 1979). Recently ecologists have 
developed Markov chains to represent the stability of a heterogeneity ecosystem over time as well 
as space (Li 1995). Techniques Markov chain model has been further developed, including model 
calibration  (Logofet  and  Korotkov  2002),  hidden  Markov  models  (Tucker  and  Anand  2005), 
combination with Monte Carlo simulation analysis (Roberts and Rosenthal 1998), and observability 
and uncertainty (Williams 2009). These advances have enabled the analysis of succession within 
various ecosystem types, from grasslands (Balzter 2000; Somodi et al. 2004), heath (White 2005) and 
forests (Korotkov et al.  2001;  Yemshanov  and  Perera  2002;  Benabdellah et al.  2003) to marine 
communities (Liu et al. 2006).  
The analysis of ecosystems using Markov-chains are based on various types of field and remotely 
sensed data sources, often combining the two to improve accuracy of the work (Neeff et al. 2005). 
Aerial photographs have previously been used as the basis for estimating  transition probabilities in 
Markov chain analysis (Li 1995; Hill et al. 2002). Aerial photographs give historical perspective and 
can be combined with secondary information such as ground surveys or maps (Martin et al. 2006). 
Current GIS data can also be successfully matched with aerial photography (Hathout 2002; Weng 
2002).  GIS  analysis  has  developed  with  the  input  of  data  and  access  to  data  becoming  easier 
(Logsdon et al. 1996), improvements in matching land use to land cover (Brown et al. 2000) and 
scaling effects (Li 2000). The NEWROC study draws on the methods of the studies mentioned here, 
as well as similar work using state-and-transition models of Australian woodlands (Hill et al. 2005; 
Spooner  and  Allcock  2006)  to  assess  the  changes  in  land  use  and  land  cover  in  the  Western 
Australian intense agricultural zone. 
The monitoring problem described here differs from most previous contributions to the literature in 
two fundamental respects.  First the variable monitored is a categorical variable classifying the state 
of  the vegetation  community  into  a  finite  number of  classes.   Most  previous  economic  studies 
describe  monitoring  an  emission  variable  where  standards  are  in  terms  of  quantities  or 
concentrations. Secondly, the monitoring problem here is dynamic and extends from 2 periods up to 
potentially an infinite time horizon.  Given this added complexity the strategic interaction between 
the landholder and the organization is not modeled explicitly, instead in the model it is characterized 
as ‘nature’ which determines if whether an environmental scheme succeeds or fails. 
Australian environmental stewardship contract schemes are on a small scale stage and will require 
further development to meet the long-term and large scale goals of environmental organizations. In 
particular, the assessment of the legal contract between the organization and the landholder to 
ensure  the  environmental  objectives  of  the  scheme  are  achieved  requires  further  attention.  At 
present,  assessment  of  compliance  and  environmental  outcomes  of  these  schemes  is  primarily 
focused  on  prediction  for  efficient  allocation  mechanisms  such  as  auctions.  The  success  of 
environmental schemes has generally measure by the quantity of inputs contracted to be supplied, 
rather than the quantity of inputs achieved or environmental services provided. 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  use  POMDP  to  explore  the  organization’s  decision  to  enter  into 
conservation contracts with landholders, whether to assess the contract or not, and if so the type of 
assessment  technology  to  employ.  The  case  study  investigates  the  organization’s  decision  to 
contract  landholders  to revegetate or maintain  native  vegetation  for  five years,  and  the  use of 5 
 
assessment of the vegetation succession to change the contract type or to withdraw from contract. 
The unit of analysis is an area of land which either had or has the potential to establish the target 
vegetation  community.  This  analysis  draws  upon  the  ecology  literature  on  how  vegetation 
successions  are  modeled,  the  economic  analysis  of  monitoring  and  irreversible  environmental 
change and the operations research analysis of dynamic monitoring and control problems.  
METHODOLOGY 
The  methodology  of  POMDP  is  described  following  the  notation  of  (White  2005).  A 
regulator/environmental organization has an objective of maximising the public value of a piece of 
private land where vegetation types are described by   discrete states    = 1,…, .  The vegetation 
type  or  state  changes  through  time  according  to  a  Markov  process  and  the  (   )  matrix  of 
transition probabilities, for instance for two vegetation states we have: 
      =  
               
                  (1). 
The elements         give the probability of the land in state   being in state   after a single period  .  
Conservation effort,   , is a measure of resources allocated to maintaining or improving the quality 
of the vegetation. In the conservation contracts the resources would be defined as labor effort by 
the landholder. The organization offers a contract that stipulates conservation effort   , and both 
parties know the resulting probability of vegetation change. Landholder labor effort increases the 
probability of a transition to the target vegetation community. 
The environmental organization has a prior probability of the current vegetation type given by the 
(1  )  vector   known  as  the  belief  state.    This  is  a  realistic  many  ecosystems  as  vegetation 
classifications are uncertain or the vegetation may be a mosaic of different vegetation classes.  Often 
the high cost of a definitive vegetation survey means that conservation schemes are initialised with 
incomplete knowledge of the current vegetation type across the whole area. The observation matrix, 
which is a function of monitoring effort    determines the accuracy of monitoring.  For two states 
the (   ) observation matrix is given by: 
      =  
               
                  (2) 
where the element          is the probability that if state   is observed the vegetation at the end of 
period   is  .  If       is an identity matrix then monitoring is perfectly accurate, if it is uniform it is 
uninformative.    Increased  monitoring  effort  raises  the  probability  of  a  correct  observation. 
Monitoring  reduces  the  uncertainty  about  which  state  the  land  is  in  and  updates  the  prior 
probability to a posterior probability by Bayes rule: 
    =
                       
                       , 
  (3) 
The new belief state is a 1 −  vector of probabilities. In vector form, (3) can be rewritten as: 
   =          ,  ,    (4) 
where   .  is the belief transformation function.  The belief state captures the history of all past 
observations and actions. 6 
 
MONITORING COSTS 
Observation can give an environmental audit which is definitive or inspect an environmental variable 
with a noisy signal Heyes (2002) Methods for monitoring vegetation change range from low cost 
remote sensing methods such as satellite images, to relatively high cost field surveys (World Bank 
1998).  We  assume  that  from  past  audits  or  ‘ground  truthing’,  these  methods  have  established 
observation matrices. We assume that the cost of monitoring depends on the observation matrix 
thus the quasi-convex monitoring cost function        is at a maximum when       is an identity 
matrix, that is the state is observed with perfect accuracy, and        = 0 when    = 0 and       is 
a uniform matrix with all elements equal to 1/ . 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION’S PROBLEM 
The  organization  maximizes  the  expected  present-value  of  the  welfare  function  in  relation  to 
abandoning, maintaining or improving an area of land by specifying landholder labor effort and their 
monitoring  effort.    The  organization’s  problem  can  be  represented  by  the  following  POMDP 
mathematical programming problem: 
      = max                        −        −          
      (5a) 
Subject to: 
   =          ,  ,    (5b) 
   =      (5c) 
The first term        in (5a) gives the net benefits of the vegetation being in state  , it is given as a 
function of et as landholder labor effort is partly determines the vegetation state.  The term        
gives the cost to the organization for procuring landholder labor effort   . Monitoring costs given by 
       depend  upon  the  monitoring  effort   .    The  term    = 1  1 +        is  the  discount  factor 
which converts net benefits generated at time t to their present-value at   = 0, g is the discount 
rate.  High discount rates reduce the value of the vegetation state improving, and indirectly labor 
effort and the value of monitoring. To simplify the notation in later sections net-benefit is defined 
as: 
     ,    =        −        −         (6) 
DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION 
Unlike  a  Markov Decision  Problem (MDP)  which  has  a  standard  dynamic  programming  solution 
(Puterman 1994), the solution to a POMDP problem is more difficult because the probability of the 
system being in a particular state depends upon past monitoring and the resulting observations.  The 
original solution by Smallwood and Sondik (1973) introduces the notion of a belief state where the 
conventional  states  of  MDP,  namely   ,  are  replaced  by  a  belief  state    which  is  the  vector  of 
probabilities of being in the states. The solution entails finding a set of actions which are optimal 7 
 
across the belief state (Cassandra 1995).  In a simplified form the optimization problem is to solve 
the following version of Bellman’s equation: 
       = max                    ,    +                                     ,  ,         (7) 
where        is the optimal value from optimizing across the time horizon from   to   starting in 
belief  state   .    The  optimal  value  comprises  two  components,  the  first  term  is  the  expected 
immediate reward and the second term is the expected reward for the remaining periods, the term 
                gives the joint probability of observing state   when the previous state is   and the 
current state  . Equation 7 is similar in construction to a standard stochastic dynamic programming 
model except for the presence of the belief state.  For instance if the initial state was known with 
certainty and there was no monitoring, optimization would proceed by maximizing the current net-
benefit whilst accounting for the effect the action has on the expected value across the remaining 
periods.  This principle of optimality still holds in POMDP except it has to solve the problem across all 
possible belief states.  This involves defining the optimal solution as a set of action vectors which are 
optimal in some belief state. 
Solving  the  dynamic  optimization  presented  in  Equation  7  is  complex  due  to  the  difficulty  of 
determining       . However, if we restrict   and    to a discrete set of values we can make use of 
the result that        is always piecewise linear and convex (Smallwood and Sondik, 1973), thus a 
modified dynamic programming algorithm can determine        as a set of vectors generated from 
different actions.  This allows us to rewrite Equation 7 as: 
       = max                     ,    +                      
    ,  ,  ,     + 1            (8) 
where   
     is a (1  ) policy vector which gives the expected payoff from an action across all the 
states. The superscript on the policy vector gives the optimal vector for a particular belief state and 
is formally defined as follows: 
    ,  ,  ,   = arg max                          
    + 1        (9) 
that is it selects the vector, by the superscript  , which gives the highest expected value for the 
belief state resulting from the prior probability, action and observation. 
CASE STUDY 
BACKGROUND 
The  Western  Australian  wheatbelt,  has  received  attention  recently  due  to  its  agricultural  and 
environmental importance. The area is of high biodiversity significance but is under threat from 
salinity, grazing, and large scale clearing (Hancock et al. 1996). The NEWROC comprises the shires of 
Koorda, Mount Marshall, Mukinbudin, Nungarin, Trayning, Westonia and Wyalkatchem (Figure 1). 
The area was 75% zoned for clearing and intensive agricultural use, with 12% of the cleared area 
remaining or remnant native vegetation. In 2002, the area of remnant vegetation in cleared areas 
within each shire ranged from 5% in the south west shire of Wyalkatchem to 21% in the eastern 




FIGURE 1 LOCATION OF NEWROC WITHIN WESTERN AUSTRALIA. 
 
 
FIGURE  2  EXTENT  OF  NATIVE  OR  REMNANT  VEGETATION  IN  NORTH-EASTERN  WHEATBELT 
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION OF COUNCILS (GOLE ET AL. 2005). 
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Yates  and  Hobbs  (1997)  detail  the  state  of  Eucalyptus  woodlands  in  southeast  and  southwest 
Australia. Woodlands have been extensively cleared and are often badly degraded due to livestock 
grazing.  Currently  it  is  estimated  only  10%  of  Eucalyptus  loxophleba  (York  gum)  and  20%  of 
Eucalyptus  salmonophloia/Eucalyptus  salubris  (salmon  gum/gimlet)  woodlands  remain.  A  similar 
situation  exists  on  the  east  coast  of  Australia,  where  0.01%  of  eucalyptus  albens  (white  box) 
woodland remains relatively unmodified. Woodland in the south-east of Australia has declined to 5% 
in 2000, with a quarter of these being less than 5 hectares and frequently grazed (Duncan and 
Dorrough 2009). 
The removal of degrading factors such as grazing and weeds may be insufficient to restore the 
woodland, with revegetation action required. Yates and Hobbs (1997) go on to identify the spectrum 
of  stable  woodland  states  that  exist  in  Eucalyptus  salmonophloia  woodlands  currently  and  the 
actions required to shift the woodland areas from one state to another. Remnant vegetation in the 
NEWROC  area  is  highly  fragmented  due  to  agricultural  clearing,  and  degraded  due  to  weeds, 
livestock grazing and firewood collection. Together with the impact of dryland salinity this means 
high levels of habitat loss, with the remaining vegetation severely degraded. The actions required 
and probability of their success in restoring the vegetation quality is largely determined by the 
current  state  of  the  woodland  and  its  ability  to shift  to  another state.  The  fencing of  remnant 
vegetation to remove livestock and feral grazing may be insufficient to return degraded woodland to 
an undegraded state. Extensive revegetation and weed control would likely be required to achieve 
this shift. The interaction of states and land use actions for NEWROC salmon gum woodland for this 
case study are shown in the diagram given in Figure 3. Photos of degraded and undegraded are 
presented in Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively. 
 
 
FIGURE 3 TRANSITIONS AND STABLE STATES OF SALMON GUM WOODLAND (BASED ON YATES 




Maintain or No Contract 
Maintain or No Contract 












FIGURE 5 AN EXAMPLE OF REVEGETATED EUCALYPTUS WOODLAND IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA, TEN 
YEARS AFTER REVEGETATION WORK TOOK PLACE. 
 
This paper uses POMDP to investigate a hypothetical conservation organization’s optimal investment 
in payment for actions and payment for outcomes in the NEWROC region. The contracting process of 
a payment-for-actions and payment-for-outcomes contract is outlined in Figure 6Error! Reference 
source  not  found.. Payment  for actions  pays the  landholder    for  undertaking  agreed  actions   
regardless of the woodland state of the land at the end of the contract. Payment for outcomes ties 
the payment amount to the woodland state observed at the end of the contract      based on 
society’s valuation of this woodland type. The study investigates two possible levels of action by the 11 
 
landholder  within  a  payment-for-actions  or  payment-for-outcomes  contract.  One  is  for  a  small 
improvement  or  maintenance  of  the  current  woodland  quality,  and  the  second  to  significantly 
improve it through revegetation. The use of independent monitoring of the site, either by an on-
ground expert or remote imagery, is also examined. Monitoring has a cost  . 
 
 
FIGURE 6 TIMELINE OF CONTRACTING PROCESS FOR PAYMENT-FOR-ACTIONS AND PAYMENT-FOR-
OUTCOMES CONTRACTS BETWEEN CONSERVATION ORGANISATION AND LANDHOLDER. 
 
MARKOV CHAIN ESTIMATION 
Time-series aerial photographs were used to identify attributes of native woodland in a section of 
NEWROC. The area selected included approximately 209 fragmented blocks of woodland on private 
land,  varying  in  size  and  management  regimes.  Changes  in  the  state  of  the  woodland  and 
management  were  estimated  by  combining  the  time-series  aerial  photographs  with  on-ground 
calibration. Photographs were captured in 1962, 1972, 1984, 1996 and 2007. Aerial photography was 
purchased from the Western Australia Land Information Authority (Landgate). Imagery was 1:25000, 
orthorectified  using  ERDAS  ER  MAPPER  to  state  road  maps  provided  by  the  Department  of 
Agriculture and Food Western Australia. The specific steps in converting aerial photographs data into 
Markov transition probabilities were: (1) entering the images, (2) classifying image attributes, (3) 
converting attributes to states using principle components analysis, (4) using regression analysis to 
link these state attributes with the woodland model states indentified in Figure 7, and (5) converting 
transitions over time into annual Markov-chain transition probabilities for unmanaged land. Figure 
7gives an example of the final classification of remnants in NEWROC into Undeg, Degw1, Degw2 and 
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Agric. These techniques could equally be applied to other forms of remote imagery (Sadler et al. 
2010). The principle components analysis, regression and Eigen value matrix manipulations were 
performed using the software package ‘R’. 
 
 
FIGURE 7 EXAMPLE OF CLASSIFICATION OF WOODLAND STATES IN THE NEWROC AREA. 
 
ECOLOGICAL STATES 
Markov  chain  analysis  represents  vegetation  types  as   discrete  states    = 1,…,  .    The 
predominant vegetation type in the NEWROC area, prior to European settlement and clearing was 
Eucalyptus  woodland.  The  vegetation  communities  or  states  of  the  salmon  gum  (Eucalyptus 
salmonophloia) woodland of southeast and southwest Western Australia as classified by Yates and 
Hobbs (1997) have been grouped into 4 states for this study; 
1.  Undegraded  woodland:  Woodland  with  a  generally  intact  shrubby  understorey,  a 
heterogeneous  litter  layer,  and  friable,  porous  soil  with  possibly  some  annual  weeds 
(Undeg). 
2.  Degraded  woodland  1:  Woodland  lacking  perennial  understorey,  except  for  a  few 
unpalatable species. Ground layer comprised entirely of annual weeds. Litter absent and soil 
compacted (Degw1). 
3.  Degraded woodland 2: Mixture of endemic perennial grasses and annual weeds with a few 
trees (Degw2). 
4.  Agricultural land: Rotations of annual crop and/or pasture species (Agric). 
The benefit and costs society gain from the different vegetation states are based on valuations from 
similar  vegetation  communities  in  eastern  Australia.  The  community  willingness  to  pay  for 13 
 
management of remnant native woodland in the Murray catchment of New South Wales was $75 
and in the North-east region of Victoria $72 (Lockwood et al. 2000). Management of remnant native 
woodland was for 40 years and included fencing large remnant vegetation blocks, prohibitions on 
clearing, and restrictions on grazing and collecting timber. Management would provide a benefit of 
$75.6 million on aggregate to the New South Wales population for management in the Murray 
catchment’s  203,429  ha  of  remnant  vegetation,  a  benefit  of  approximately  $30/ha/year. 
Management  of  the  113,313  ha  of  remnant  vegetation  North-east  of  Victoria  would  benefit 
Victorians by $60.7 million, approximately $40/ha/year. Transposing these estimates to NEWROC, 
the environmental organization is assumed to benefits of $40/ha/year from Undegraded woodland, 
and  $30  from  Degwood1.  Degw2  and  Agric  vegetation  states  are  assumed  to  not  provide  any 
benefits to society or the environmental organization. 
Private landholders frequently identify the ecological, aesthetic and recreation benefits they receive 
from managing remnant vegetation, as well as the agricultural production advantages (Lockwood, 
Walpole et al. 2000; Moore and Renton 2002). Research to date has not quantified these non-
agricultural benefits, rather estimating opportunity costs from not clearing and livestock advantages. 
In this study, the landholders’ value of the improvement in vegetation is assumed to be incorporated 
into  the  estimated  cost  to  the  environmental  organization  of  engaging  private  landholders  to 
undertake  environmental  work.  Any  discrepancy  between  the  direct  cost  of  the  work  to  the 
landholder and the payment required from the environmental organization to undertake the work, 
is  assumed to  be  the  agricultural  and  non-agricultural  benefits of the  improvement  in  remnant 
vegetation to the landholder. 
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION ACTIONS 
Action choices are defined as the states were, a set of   discrete actions    = 1,…, .  Yates and 
Hobbs (1997) identify 16 transitions between the 8 states due to various actions taken by land 
holders and/or regulators. These 16 transitions have been simplified into 3 actions available to the 
environmental organization when contracting with a private landholder: 
1.  Revegetation: a contract with the landholder for intensive revegetation work and maintenance to 
improve the biodiversity condition of existing remnants of native woodland or establishment of new 
sites (Reveg); 
2.  Maintenance: a contract to maintain the existing biodiversity condition of remnant native woodland 
(Maintain); or  
3.  No Contract: not entering into any contract, i.e. the status quo of voluntary revegetation works, 
grazing, etc. at the landholder’s discretion (No Contract).  
The Revegetation (Reveg) contract requires the landholder to undertake actions including; fencing 
remnant  vegetation  blocks,  planting  of  woodland  species,  controlling  weeds  and  prohibition  of 
grazing and collecting timber. These actions are typical of intensive revegetation schemes such as 
the Auctions for Landscape Recovery in WA (Gole, Burton et al. 2005). Maintenance (Maintain) 
requires the landholder to fence remnant native vegetation, but they are allowed limited grazing 
and collection of firewood or fence post timber (Lockwood, Walpole et al. 2000). Each action has an 
associated benefits and cost, and expected impact on the transition between vegetation states. The 14 
 
action choice by the environmental organization changes the net benefit (     ,   ) by altering the 
cost of the action choice (      ) and the benefits of the vegetation state as stated above (      ). 
The cost of contracting land for Reveg is $350 per hectare per year (Gole, Burton et al. 2005), and 
Maintain is $30 per hectare per year (Lockwood, Walpole et al. 2000). 
An action leads to a change in the state according to a Markov process and an (   ) matrix of 
transition probabilities. Each element         gives the probability of the land in state   being in state 
  after a single period  . The transition probability matrix in Table 1 gives the predicted end state of 
the vegetation given the start state for each action over 5 years. The No Contract matrix is estimated 
from aerial photography of the NEWROC as described above. The transition probabilities are an 
average for the NEWROC, incorporating differences in topography, climate, and landholder skill and 
landholder compliance across the region.  
Estimates for Maintain and Reveg are calculated based on the No Contract matrix (Table 1). The 
Maintain contract is assumed to prevent the land from being used for agricultural production and 
becoming the state Agric at the end of the period. With a Maintain contract, the probability of the 
land being Agric at the end of the period for No Contract is reallocated to Undeg, Degw1 and Degw2 
based on the probability of these states occurring. For example, with No Contract there is a 7% 
probability of Degw2 land being Agric at completion of the period. With a Maintain contract the 
probability of Degw2 becoming Agric at the end of the period is zero. The 7% probability previously 
assigned to Agric is distributed across Undeg, Degw1 and Degw2 according to their probability of 
occurring with No Contract. In this case, it is an additional 1% to Undeg, 1% to Degw1 and 5% to 
Degw2. Leading to the probability of Degw2 being Undeg at completion of the Maintain contract 
being 10%, Degw1 10% and Degw2 80%. A Reveg contract is assumed to prevent the woodland 
remaining or becoming Agric or Degw2 at the end of the period. The probably of Agric and Degw2 is 
then reallocated as in the Maintain example. 
 
TABLE 1 FIVE YEAR PROBABILITY OF TRANSITION MATRIX BETWEEN VEGETATION STATES FOR 
EACH ACTION. 
No Contract         
  Undeg  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
Undeg  0.83  0.03  0.04  0.1 
Degw1  0.15  0.17  0.32  0.36 
Degw2  0.09  0.09  0.75  0.07 
Agric  0.07  0.01  0.09  0.83 
         
Maintenance Contract         
  Undeg  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
Undeg  0.92  0.04  0.04  0 
Degw1  0.23  0.26  0.6  0 
Degw2  0.1  0.1  0.8  0 
Agric  0.42  0.04  0.54  0 
         15 
 
Revegetation Contract         
  Undeg  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
Undeg  0.96  0.04  0  0 
Degw1  0.47  0.53  0  0 
Degw2  0.49  0.51  0  0 
Agric  0.91  0.09  0  0 
 
 
The state of the land and choice of action and monitoring determine the net benefit to the regulator 
of the land for each period of the analysis. The cost of contracting land ( ( ) i t c e ) for revegetation 
(Reveg)  is  $86  per  hectare  per  year  (Gole,  Burton  et  al.  2005),  and  maintenance  of  current 
vegetation  (Maintain)  is  $42  per  hectare  per  year  (Lockwood,  Walpole  et  al.  2000).  While  not 
entering a contract (No Contract) does not incur a cost or provide a benefit to the regulator. Land 
being in the state of Undegw or Degw1 provides a benefit to wider society and the regulator, or non-
market value. The community willingness to pay for remnant native woodland vegetation in the 
Murray catchment of New South Wales is used as an estimate of the benefit to wider society and 
regulator of salmon gum woodland in NEWROC ( ( ) i t g e ); $91 per hectare per year for Undeg and 
$46  per  hectare  per  year  for  Degw1  (Lockwood,  Walpole  et  al.  2000).  Monitoring  the  land  to 
determine its current vegetation state requires engaging a local expert and is estimated to cost (c
m) 
$8 per hectare per year (Gole, Burton et al. 2005). 
“Monitoring” refers to the environmental organization observing the state of the vegetation at the 
end of the contract period. The observation recorded is used to determine future contracted actions 
and the payment amount for the contract. For a Reveg contract, if Undeg is observed, the landholder 
receives the full payment amount, $350/ha/year. However, if Degw1 is observed, the payment is 
reduced by 25% to $260/ha/year, and if Degw2 or Agric is observed the payment is zero. A Maintain 
contract pays the landholder the full $30/ha/year if Undeg is observed at completion of the contract, 
$22/ha/year if Degw1 and zero if Degw2 or Agric are observed. The discount to the landholder 
payment is the same proportion as the discount for society’s valuation of Degw1, Degw2 and Agric 
compared with Undeg. 
The  combinations  of  conservation  contract  type  and  monitoring  effort  give  six  different  action 
options for the regulator to choose from: 
1.  No Contract-Monitor  
2.  Maintain-Monitor  
3.  Reveg-Monitor  
4.  No Contract-No Monitor  
5.  Maintain-No Monitor  
6.  Reveg-No Monitor.  
Undertaking monitoring is costly and does not necessarily provide perfect information about the 
woodland state. This study investigates the optimal monitoring decision (whether to monitor or 16 
 
not),  with  a  choice  between  on-ground  monitoring  by  an  expert  with  knowledge  of  the  local 
ecosystem, or monitoring by remote sensing using satellite imagery. Monitoring is estimated to cost 
(c
m) $8 per hectare per period when using field visits by a local expert (Gole, Burton et al. 2005), and 
$1 per hectare per period for remote sensing. The (   ) observation matrix, which is a function of 
monitoring effort   , specifies the accuracy of monitoring. Each element          is the probability 
that if state   is observed, the woodland at the end of period   is  , i.e. how accurately the end 
woodland  state  is  observed.  Reviews  of  agri-environmental  policy  monitoring  conclude  that 
monitoring to assess ecosystem change incurs significant costs and is prone to inaccuracy in the 
form of misclassifications of woodland types (Hooper 1992; National Audit Office 1997; World Bank 
1998). Remote sensing is seen to accurately identifying grassland types of 64%  of the time (Peterson 
et  al.  2002)  and  accurately  map  grass  cover  density  89%  of  the  time  (Zha  et  al.  2003).  The 
observation matrix of all actions for field monitoring is given in Table 0-2 and for remote sensing 
monitoring in Table 0-3. 
 
TABLE 0-2 ACCURACY OF OBSERVATION FOR FIELD MONITORING. 
      Observed state   
    Undeg  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
  Undeg  0.95  0.05  0  0 
Actual state 
Degw1  0.05  0.9  0.05  0 
Degw2  0  0.05  0.9  0.05 
  Agric  0  0  0.05  0.95 
 
Table 0-3 Accuracy of observation for field monitoring. 
      Observed state   
    Undeg  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
  Undeg  0.75  0.25  0  0 
Actual state 
Degw1  0.15  0.7  0.15  0 
Degw2  0  0.15  0.7  0.15 
  Agric  0  0  0.25  0.75 
 
An annual discount factor of    = 0.93 (discount rate of seven percent) is assumed for all analysis. 
This discount rate was applied for consistency with the valuation of NEWROC woodland based on 
the valuation of native remnant woodland in NSW and Victoria that applied a discount factor of 0.93 
(Lockwood, Walpole et al. 2000). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
There is a positive return to the environmental organization for contracting with the landholder with 
a payment-for-outcomes contract in some circumstances. The optimal decision for the organization 
considering offering a 5-year payment-for-outcomes contract to the landholders is determined by 
the decision timeframe and their initial belief about the state of the woodland. The organization can 
contract the landholder for Maintain-Monitor or Reveg-Monitor and the payment amount will be 17 
 
determined  by  the  observed  woodland  state  (payment  for  outcomes).  Alternatively  the 
environmental  organization  can  contract  Maintain-No  Monitor  or  Reveg-No  Monitor  and  the 
payment amount is not based on the woodland state observed (payment for actions). The analysis 
then highlights the environmental organization’s preference between a payment-for-actions and 
payment-for-outcomes contracts, as well as their preference between field and remote monitoring. 
The  various  optimal  sequences  of  actions  for  the  environmental  organization  over  different 
timeframes are shown in policy graphs, such as Figure 8 for perfect monitoring. The level of the 
diagram marked ‘5 years’ gives the optimal decision choice of the environmental organization when 
they have a five-year decision timeframe. The level marked 10 years gives the optimal decision initial 
action for the first 5-year period, and their decision in the following five-year period is given in the 
level below. For example, to read the policy graph  for the environmental organization taking a 
decision timeframe of 15 years, firstly select one of the actions list at ‘15 years’ as the action for the 
first five years of the decision timeframe. Second, follow the arrow to the subsequent action for a 10 
year timeframe. The second decision of the conservation agency with a 15-year timeframe is an 
action of the 10-year timeframe. When Monitor occurs the arrow choice in the following period is 
notated by U, D1, D2 or A depending on the woodland state observed being Undeg, Degw1, Degw2 
or  Agric  respectively.  Lastly,  in  the  final  five year period  the  environmental  organization  would 
always do the action given at ‘5 years’. In this way, the optimal sequence of actions (the action 
vector) for a decision timeframe builds on the optimal action vector of the shorter timeframes it 
incorporates. 
PERFECT AND COSTLESS MONITORING 
The environmental organization with a 25-year timeframe and perfect, costless monitoring should 
commence  with  Maintain-Monitor  (vector  0),  or  No  Contract-Monitor  (vector  1).  No  Contract-
Monitor is used to identify Agric land so the environmental organization can then contract Maintain-
Monitor in the following five-year period to improve the woodland state. If Undeg, Degw1 or Degw2 
is observed at the end of 10 years, the environmental organization should undertake No Contract-No 
Monitor. Monitoring also enables the environmental organization to reduce the payment to the 
landholder  depending  on the  woodland  state observed  at the  end of  the  contract.  As  outlined 
above,  the  payment  if  Undeg  is  observed  is  the  full  payment  amount  for  the  contract  type 
($350/ha/year), or 75% of the payment if Degw1 is observed ($260/ha/year), or $0/ha/year if Degw2 
or Agric is observed. The next action in the sequence following Maintain-Monitor or No Contract-No 





FIGURE  8  POLICY  GRAPH  OF  OPTIMAL  ACTION  SEQUENCES  FOR  THE  ENVIRONMENTAL 
ORGANIZATION OFFERING A 5-YEAR PAYMENT-FOR-OUTCOMES CONTRACT, WITH PERFECT AND 
COSTLESS MONITORING (NOTE: U=UNDEG, D1=DEGW1, D2=DEGW2, A=AGRIC). 
 
Table 4 gives the net present value of the optimal actions for a sample of prior probabilities relating 
to  the  state.  When  monitoring  is  perfect  and  costless,  it  is  optimal  for  the  environmental 
organization to enter a payment-for-outcomes contract when the woodland state is likely to be 
Agric. Monitoring is employed to identify when other land types degrade to Agric to then offer a 
contract  and  improve  this  Agric  land.  Monitoring  is  also  employed  to  determine  the  payment 
amount  at  completion  of  the  contract,  reducing  the  cost  of the  program  to  the  environmental 
organization (by avoiding payment in some cases). Compared with a payment-for-actions contract, 
payment  for  outcomes  with  perfect  monitoring  increases  the  net  present  value  of  the  optimal 
decision by between 2% (if Undeg) and 107% (if Agric). 
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TABLE 4 OPTIMAL ACTION VECTOR FOR A ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION OFFERING A 5-YEAR 
PAYMENT-FOR-OUTCOMES  CONTRACT  WITH  PERFECT  AND  COSTLESS  MONITORING,  FOR  A 
SAMPLE OF DIFFERENT PROBABILITIES OF THE INITIAL WOODLAND STATE.  
Probability of initial state 
Optimal Initial Action 
Net present 
value  Undeg  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
0.5  0.5      No Contract-Monitor (1)  269 
0.5    0.5    No Contract-Monitor (1)  223 
0.5      0.5  No Contract-Monitor (1)  221 
1        No Contract-Monitor (1)  359 
  0.5  0.5    No Contract-Monitor (1)  133 
  0.5    0.5  Maintain-Monitor (0)  133 
  1      No Contract-Monitor (1)  180 
    0.5  0.5  Maintain-Monitor (0)  90 
    1    No Contract-Monitor (1)  87 
      1  Maintain-Monitor (0)  112 
 
FIELD MONITORING 
Figure 9 shows the optimal sequences of payment-for-outcome contracting and not contracting by 
the  environmental  organization  over  different  timeframes  when  field  monitoring  is  possible. 
Comparing  Figure  9  and  Figure  8  shows  the  change  in  the  optimal  action  choices  of  the 
environmental organization using inaccurate field monitoring rather than perfect monitoring. When 
using field monitoring, the organization with a 25-year decision timeframe should commence with 
Maintain-Monitor  (action vector  0),  No  Contract-Monitor  (vector  1), or  No Contract-No Monitor 





FIGURE  9  POLICY  GRAPH  OF  OPTIMAL  ACTION  SEQUENCES  FOR  THE  ENVIRONMENTAL 
ORGANIZATION  OFFERING  A  5-YEAR  PAYMENT-FOR-OUTCOMES  CONTRACT  WITH  FIELD 
MONITORING (NOTE: U=UNDEG, D1=DEGW1, D2=DEGW2, A=AGRIC). 
 
From Table 1-7, field monitoring reduces the net present value by between approximately 2% and 
13%, depending on the initial state of the woodland, relative to perfect information. When the 
woodland  is  Agric,  the  optimal  initial  action  is  Maintain-Monitor,  followed  by  No  Contract-No 
Monitor (vector 0). Monitoring of Maintain enables the environmental organization to reduce the 
payment to the landholder if Degw1 is observed, and pay $0/ha/year if Degw2 or Agric is observed. 
When the state is Agric, the optimal action sequence of a Maintain-Monitor payment-for-outcomes 
contract, followed by No Contract-No Monitor (vector 0), has a net present value of $100/ha. This 
compares  to  the  maximum  net  present  value  of  $112/ha  achieved  by  a  payment-for-outcomes 
contract with perfect and costless monitoring. 
On Degw1 land, the environmental organization should No Contract-Monitor for the initial period 
(vector 1). This is followed by Maintain-Monitor if Agric is observed at the end of the period, or No 
Contract-No Monitor if Undeg, Degw1 or Degw2 is observed. No Contract-Monitor is used to identify 
Agric land, and strategically invest in Maintain-Monitor where it has a positive return. When the 
woodland is Degw1 and vector 1 is undertaken, the net present value is $166/ha. The net present 
value for this sequence when monitoring is perfect and costless is $180/ha. 
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If the initial woodland state is likely or known to be Undeg or Degw2, the optimal action for the 
entire 25-year decision timeframe is No Contract-No Monitor (vector 2). No Contract-No Monitor 
when the woodland state is Undeg or Degw2 for 25 years (vector 2), has a net present value of $353 
or $83/ha. This is identical to the return of the payment-for-actions as contracting does not occur. 
However, it is lower than a payment-for-outcomes contract with perfect monitoring, which achieved 
$359 and $87/ha for Undeg and Degw2 respectively by continuously monitoring and contracting to 
improve Agric land that appeared. 
 
TABLE 5 OPTIMAL ACTION VECTOR FOR A ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION OFFERING A 5-YEAR 
PAYMENT-FOR-OUTCOMES CONTRACT WITH FIELD MONITORING, FOR DIFFERENT PROBABILITIES 
OF THE INITIAL WOODLAND STATE. 
Probability of initial state  Initial action  
(action vector number) 
Net present 
value  Undeg  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
0.5  0.5        No Contract-No Monitor (2)  259 
0.5     0.5     No Contract-No Monitor (2)  218 
0.5        0.5  No Contract-Monitor (1)  208 
1           No Contract-No Monitor (2)  353 
   0.5  0.5     No Contract-No Monitor (2)  124 
   0.5     0.5  Maintain-Monitor (0)  121 
   1        No Contract-Monitor (1)  166 
      0.5  0.5  Maintain-Monitor (0)  78 
      1     No Contract-No Monitor (2)  83 
         1  Maintain-Monitor (0)  100 
 
Field monitoring reduces the net present value of the optimal action vector for all possible initial 
woodland types compared with perfect and costless monitoring. The reduction is only 2% when the 
environmental  organization  is  confident  of  the  initial  state  of  the  woodland  being  Undeg,  but 
increases to 11% when  they  are  uncertain  if  it  is Dewg2 or  Agric.  The  reduction  is  due  to  the 
environmental organization not monitoring constantly with field monitoring compared with perfect 
monitoring. Constant monitoring when it is perfect and costless allows the organization to identify 
any land that becomes Agric for contracting in the following period. The inaccuracy and cost of field 
monitoring  reduce  its  use  in  some  circumstances  and  the  overall  return  to  the  environmental 
organization.  
REMOTE MONITORING 
In this model, when offering a payment-for-outcomes contract, it is preferable for the environmental 
organization to use remote monitoring rather than field monitoring. Figure 10 shows the optimal 
action  vectors  for  a  environmental  organization  using  remote  monitoring.  Contrasting  this  with 
Figure 8 and Figure 9 shows the impact that remote monitoring has on the optimal action sequence 
for  the  environmental  organization  compared  with  perfect  or  field  monitoring  respectively.  A 
environmental organization considering remote monitoring with a 25-year decision timeframe has 5 
optimal  action  vectors,  one  beginning  with  Maintain-Monitor  (vector  0),  two  No  Contract-No 
Monitor (vector 1,2) and three No Contract-Monitor (vector 3,4,5). Each vector differs in how the 





FIGURE 10 POLICY GRAPH OF OPTIMAL ACTION SEQUENCES FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION OFFERING A 5-YEAR PAYMENT-FOR-OUTCOMES 
CONTRACT, WITH REMOTE MONITORING (NOTE: U=UNDEG, D1=DEGW1, D2=DEGW2, A=AGRIC). 
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The net present value of the optimal action vector using remote monitoring for different 
probabilities of the initial woodland state is given in Table 6. Comparing this with the net 
present  value  of  the  optimal  sequence  with  perfect  monitoring  in  Table  4  and  field 
monitoring in Table 5 shows the impact remote monitoring has on the outcome for the 
environmental organization. Both remote monitoring and field monitoring reduce the net 
present  value  compared  with  perfect  monitoring,  but  the  reduction  is  larger  for  field 
monitoring. Remote monitoring reduces the return on the optimal action by 1% when the 
land is Undeg, 4% when Degw1, 5% when Degw and 6% when Agric, compared with perfect 
monitoring. Field monitoring reduces the return on the optimal action by 2% when the land 
is Undeg, 8% when Degw1, 5% when Degw and 11% when Agric. 
If the land is known or likely to be Agric it is optimal to contract Maintain-Monitor in the 
initial period, then No Contract-No Monitor until the end of the decision timeframe (vector 
0). When the land is Agric the net present value of the optimal Maintain-Monitor then No 
Contract-No Monitor sequence is $105/ha. This compares to $105/ha with field monitoring 
and $112/ha with perfect and costless monitoring. 
The environmental organization should undertake No Contract-Monitor if the woodland is 
likely to initially be Undeg or Degw1 in order to identify any land which becomes Agric 
(vector 5). When Agric land is observed it is then contracted Maintain-Monitor. If Undeg, 
Degw1 or Degw2 is observed at the end of the period it is left to No Contract-No Monitor. 
The net present value of this optimal action vector is $355/ha for Undeg and $172/ha for 
Degw1. With field monitoring the net present value of the optimal action vector for Undeg 
was  $353/ha  and  Degw1  $166/ha.  A  payment-for-outcomes  contract  with  perfect 
monitoring would achieve a net present value of $359/ha if Undeg and $180/ha if Degw1. 
If the land is Degw2 it is optimal to No Contract-No Monitor for the entire 25 year decision 
timeframe.  The  net  present  value  of  this  sequence  is  $83/ha,  which  is  identical  to  a 
payment-for-outcomes contract with field monitoring but lower than the $87/ha achieved 
with perfect and costless monitoring. 
 
TABLE 6 OPTIMAL ACTION VECTOR FOR A ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION OFFERING A 
5-YEAR  PAYMENT-FOR-OUTCOMES  CONTRACT  WITH  REMOTE  MONITORING,  FOR 
DIFFERENT PROBABILITIES OF THE INITIAL WOODLAND STATE. 25 
 
Probability of initial state  Initial action  
(action vector number) 
Net present 
value  Undeg  Degw1  Degw2  Agric 
0.5  0.5        No Contract-Monitor (5)  263 
0.5     0.5     No Contract-No Mon (2)  218 
0.5        0.5  No Contract-Monitor (4)  216 
1           No Contract-Monitor (5)  355 
   0.5  0.5     No Contract-Monitor (5)  127 
   0.5     0.5  Maintain-Monitor (0)  127 
   1        No Contract-Monitor (5)  172 
      0.5  0.5  Maintain-Monitor (0)  81 
      1     No Contract-No Mon (1)  83 
         1  Maintain-Monitor (0)  105 
 
In  NEWROC,  the  conservation  organization  should  only  contract  a  landholder  with  a 
payment-for-outcomes contract to improve the woodland when the current state of the 
woodland is likely to be Agric and the decision timeframe is at least 10 years. When the 
woodland is currently Degw2, Degw1 or Undeg it is optimal not to institute a payment-for-
outcomes contract with the landholder, and the woodland is left to decline at its natural 
rate. A payment-for-actions contract is not offered with any woodland type. A preference for 
a payment-for-outcomes contract over a payment-for-actions contract is observed across all 
assessment types, including perfect assessment. Payment for outcomes increases the net 
present value of the optimal action vector undertaken by the environmental organization 
compared with payment for actions as it eliminates the cost of payment when the outcome 
is unfavorable.  
In the base-case runs for this model, monitoring of a payment-for-outcomes contract can 
reduce the cost of achieving environmental outcomes in two ways. Firstly by reducing the 
payment amount when low-quality woodland is observed, and secondly by identifying land 
where  contracting  has  a  positive  return  on  investment.  Comparing  field  and  remote 
monitoring to perfect and costless monitoring shows that low-cost remote monitoring gives 
a higher return to the environmental organization than field monitoring. Remote monitoring 
is used over a wider range of prior probabilities relating to the initial woodland state. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the base-case analysis presented in this paper, contracting landholders in the NEWROC 
region to improve the woodland state is only optimal for an environmental organization 
when  the  following  combination  of  circumstances  is  present:  the  environmental 
organization bases the contract payment amount on the observed woodland state at the 
completion of the contract, the woodland state is probably Agric and the decision timeframe 
is at least 10 years. For other states (i.e. Undeg, Degw1, and Degw2), would only be optimal 
to offer contracts if the cost of the contract is reduced or the woodland is of high value 
relative to the base-case scenario. In this model, a contract with payment based on the 
woodland  state  at  the  contract’s  completion  is  generally  superior  to  payment  without 
monitoring . This is reflected in the results showing that, monitoring almost always selected 
when contracting is optimal. 26 
 
In this case study, if monitoring is employed by the environmental organization solely to 
improve decision making, then it should be used when the environmental organization is 
uncertain  about  the  woodland  state,  the  decision  timeframe  is  sufficiently  long,  and  a 
payment-for-outcomes  contract  is  applied.  The  environmental  organization’s  decision 
timeframe must be at least 20 years if field monitoring is used and 15 years if perfect or 
remote  monitoring  is  used.  A  longer  decision  timeframe  means  the  environmental 
organization has a longer time to accrue benefits from the improved decision making.  
In most circumstances examined, actions with remote monitoring had a higher net present 
value  than  did  actions  with  field  monitoring.  Also  it  is  optimal  for  the  environmental 
organization to employ remote monitoring over more belief states for the initial woodland 
state than field monitoring. Overall, the lower cost of remote monitoring is usually sufficient 
to outweigh the slight diminution of benefits from better decision making.  
The  POMDP  model  does  not  link  monitoring  to  the  landholder’s  behavior.  Rather, 
monitoring in this model has value only from improving the environmental organization’s 
decision making prior to investment in a contract or to determine the payment amount at 
completion the contract. The landholder receives their payment based on the woodland 
state of the land at the end of the contract, but this outcome is not related to their behavior, 
as the POMDP model describes the conservation organization’s optimal decision when faced 
with  a  compliant  landholder.  The  impact  of  the  landholder’s  behavioral  response  to 
inaccurate monitoring is investigated in further research. 
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